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PURPOSE: Many post-menopausal women who are treated for early-stage breast cancer 
report experiencing cognitive difficulties following adjuvant chemotherapy.  However, the 
generalizability of the results of a number of studies that have attempted to document the 
association between adjuvant chemotherapy and cognitive dysfunction has been limitd due o 
inconsistencies in the investigative methods used, thus introducing the possibility that other 
factors are contributing to reports of cognitive problems.  The current study examin s the 
possibility that a history of mood disorders in post-menopausal breast cancer patients predisposes 
them to cognitive difficulties following adjuvant treatment. METHODS: Sixty-five 
postmenopausal women with non-metastatic breast cancer were administered the SCID-I before 
adjuvant therapy (Time 1) to determine psychiatric status.  Thirty women were found to have a 
history of mood disorder, while thirty-one women were found to have no history of mood 
disorder. Participants were administered neuropsychological tests before adjuvant therapy (Time 
1), six months after treatment (Time 2), and at a final six-month follow-up (Time 3). Cognitive 
domains measured included motor, language, attention/concentration/working memory, 
visuospatial, memory (verbal and visual). RESULTS:  Group comparisons found significant 
iv 
 
differences in several domains at Time 1 (attention) and Time 2 (visual spatial and visual 
memory), but in each case the mood disorder group means were higher than the group means of
the non-mood disorder group.  No significant results were found at Time 3. CONCLUSION: In 
postmenopausal women, a history of mood disorder was associated with higher performance in 
selected cognitive domains.  Reasons for these paradoxical results are explord and suggestions 
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The Impact of Mood Disorders on Cognitive Dysfunction in Post-Menopausal Women 
Undergoing Treatment for Early-Stage Breast Cancer 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Many women who are treated for early-stage breast cancer report cognitive 
difficulties following adjuvant chemotherapy (Ahles et al., 2002; Jenkins et al., 2006; 
Brezden, Phillips, Abdollel, & Tannock, 2000; Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et al., 
1998; Wieneke & Dienst, 1995). The researchers who first investigated this phenomeno  
used standard neuropsychological tests to assess post-treatment performance in this 
population in a number of cognitive domains and found that breast cancer participants 
who had chemotherapy treatment scored significantly lower on the cognitive measures 
compared to breast cancer participants who did not have chemoptherapy treatment (Ahles 
et al., 2002; Jenkins et al., 2006; Brezden et al., 2000; Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et 
al., 1998; Wieneke & Dienst, 1995). The investigators inferred that these differences 
could be attributed to chemotherapy treatment.   
However, there were significant limitations to the design of these initial studie .  
First, the researchers assessed the subject’s cognitive functioning following 
chemotherapy treatment, thus forcing them to compare subject performance to that of 
population norms or control groups, rather than to baseline measures of the subject’s own 
pre-treatment cognitive functioning.  Further, the participants were assessed at a variety 
of times post-treatment (Ahles et al., 2002; Jenkins et al., 2006; Brezden et al., 2000;  
Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et al., 1998; Wieneke & Dienst, 1995), meaning there was 
no uniformity to the time points studied, adding the confound that time post-treatment 
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might also be a factor in cognitive performance.  Finally, the researchers did not separate 
participants by menopausal status, introducing an additional confound as estrogen has 
been found in some studies (Aveleyra, Carranza-Lira, & Ulloa-Aguirre, 2005; Bagger, 
Tanko, Alexandersen, Qin, & Christiansen, 2005) to protect cognitive functioning. 
The breast cancer research community recognized the importance of these 
discoveries in spite of the limitations of the investigations that yielded them, and w s 
careful to base the next generation of research on longitudinal studies that included a 
measure of cognitive functioning prior to the advent of chemotherapy treatment, thus 
establishing a baseline measure for comparison (Stewart et al., 2008; Jenkins et al., 
2006).    They also adopted more uniform criteria regarding what constituted impaired 
cognitive functioning in a within-participants research design.  However, variations 
remained in the menopausal status of subject groups and the in the lengths of time 
participants were assessed following chemotherapy. 
In spite of continued differences in assessment design, two constants emerged 
from the second generation of research.  First, a large number of women in the studies – 
up to 35% in one study (Wefel et al., 2004) – were found to be cognitively impaired rior 
to undergoing chemotherapy treatment, a finding that called into question the conclusions 
regarding impaired cognitive performance following chemotherapy treatment made by 
the first generation of research.  Second, while the prospective studies did uncover 
evidence of change in cognitive functioning following chemotherapy, the associ tions 
were weak and did not follow a consistent pattern (Jansen, Miaskowski, Dodd, Dowling, 
& Kramer, 2005).   
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Recently, breast cancer researchers turned to brain imaging studies in a continuing 
attempt to uncover physical evidence that will definitively link chemotherapy treatment 
to cognitive dysfunction.  Using a variety of techniques (Ganguli, 2006; Hull, 2002), 
investigators have examined the brains of breast cancer survivors who have had 
chemotherapy and report finding differences in the size and volume of certain brain 
structures and regions compared to those of population norms.  However, the imaging 
studies suffer from some of the same limitations as the first generation cognitive studies:  
an absence of baseline images to use as a basis for comparison, a lack of uniformity in the 
times following chemotherapy when images are made, and a lack of control over age and 
menopausal status of participants.  Further, there is no consistency in the questions being 
asked by the imaging researchers – some examine the sizes of a subject’s hippocampus 
looking for explanations for memory loss, while others look at blood flow in cortical 
regions in an attempt to account for problems with executive functioning.  
This leaves us with an interesting problem.   Breast cancer survivors continue to 
report problems with memory, attention, concentration, and motor function and a 
significant number of them are experiencing cognitive dysfunction.  However, the 
hypotheses underlying the research into this phenomenon to date – that chemotherapy 
treatment is somehow responsible for their experience of cognitive dysfunction – has yet 
to be convincingly demonstrated by the chosen methods of assessment.   
Therefore, it is time to examine this phenomenon from a different perspective.  As 
noted above, a significant number of breast cancer survivors are eporting cognitive 
problems following treatment; however, it is possible that the women who are reporting 
cognitive problems are in some way different from those who are not.  Perhaps the 
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women who report experiencing cognitive problems are more vulnerable to disruption 
than their peers and perhaps this vulnerability is a p ychological one.   
The question asked by the present research is the following: is the presence of a 
pre-existing mood disorder, which will be defined here as depression, anxiety, or a 
combination of depression and anxiety – predictive of significant cognitive changes in 
post-menopausal women being treated for early-stage breast cancer?  In other words, 
does a pre-existing mood disorder predispose a breast cancer patient to cognitive 
difficulties following chemotherapy treatment? 
 




The Mind-Body Relationship 
The Mind-Body Relationship and the Origins of Psychology and Psychoanalysis 
Modern psychology was introduced to the world in the late 1880s by Jean-Martin 
Charcot, a neurologist whose observations of and experiments with the so-called 
“hysterics” at the Salpetriere asylum in Paris clearly demonstrated the mind’s power to 
disrupt the brain’s normative functioning.   Charcot attracted the attention of the curious 
in the nascent world of neurology by using hypnosis and suggestion at his famous 
“Tuesday lessons” (Goetz, Bonduelle, & Gelfand, 1995) to administer seemingly 
miraculous cures to the mysteriously afflicted participants in his care.  On of the curious 
was Sigmund Freud, who is known to have attended Charcot’s demonstrations for a five 
month period between 1884 and 1885 (Goetz et al., 1995). 
  Upon his return from France, Freud introduced what he had learned from 
Charcot to his partner Joseph Breuer and the two began to use hypnosis and suggestion 
with their hysterical participants, eventually documenting the theory and method behind 
this new treatment (Freud & Breuer, 2004). Using evidence gathered from individual 
cases, Freud and Breuer challenged the current belief that hysteria was solely a physical 
illness, arguing instead that it was a psychic disorder, in which the emotion ass ciated 
with distressing experiences and memories, rather than being expressed through normal 
channels, was somehow removed from consciousness and expressed through physical 
symptoms. Freud made his famously prophetic statement that “hysterics suffer mainly 
from reminiscences” (Freud & Breuer, 2004) following his and Breuer’s succe ses with a 
series of participants, including the infamous Anna O., thus grounding the etiology of 
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psychopathology in the individual’s reactions to and subsequent repression of distressing 
real-life experiences. 
Freud’s early use of the “the talking cure” (Freud & Breuer, 2004) was rooted in 
his belief in the power of  experiential “reminiscences” to influence and distort an 
individual’s current thought, beliefs, and behavior which were then manifested as 
hysteria or other emotional problems.  He focused on uncovering his participants’ 
disguised, disavowed, or repressed memories, delving into their pasts and attempting to 
free them from the secrets that were crippling them, literally and figuratively.  In the 
course of these investigations, many of Freud’s participants reported experiencing 
emotional, physical, and sexual abuse at the hands of family members, often their 
parents, when they were children.  The overwhelming amount of data he collected that 
contained these disturbing details led Freud to propose that the origins of hysteria and all 
other neuroses lay in “infantile sexual abuse” (Mitchell & Black, 1995).  Freud formally 
presented these findings in “The Aetiology of Hysteria” in 1896.  Legend has it that the 
idea of widespread pedophilia and other abuses so scandalized the upper-classes of 
Victorian Vienna that Freud was forced to back away from his “seduction theory”  
(Freud, 1896) and propose instead that his participants’ memories were based in part on 
fantasy and wish.   
Regardless of what actually happened, one outcome of the uproar is clear.  Freud 
abandoned his belief in the pathognomic power of actual experience and retreated to the 
one-mind world of intrapsychic drives and fantasy and, for the most part, took 
psychology and psychoanalysis with him. 
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The Return to Repression of the “Real" 
In the decades following Freud’s disavowal of the centrality of real-life 
experiences in the etiology of neuroses and other psychological problems, psychoanalytic 
theory focused almost exclusively on conflicts between the components of Freud’s 
structural model – the id, ego, and superego – and the drives, unconscious wishes, and 
fantasies fueling these conflicts (Mitchell & Black, 1995).  However, World War I and 
the trench warfare that characterized this struggle reignited interest in the role those 
environmental forces, particularly traumatic ones, played in formation of psychological 
problems.  The disorder that came to be known as “shell shock,” characterized by 
symptoms now associated with posttraumatic stress disorder, was experienced by 
thousands of soldiers who during battle lay helplessly trapped in trenches and foxholes as 
bombs and mortar shells rained down on them with devastating impact.  Not only were 
these soldiers terrified and shaken by the unrelenting noise of explosions, they were 
helpless to act as their comrades were often blown to pieces next to them.  The screams 
of the injured, left waiting for rescue and treatment that could not be provided until a 
particular fusillade had ceased, completed the traumatogenic picture (Rivers, 1918). 
 W.H. Rivers, a British psychiatrist, observed numerous cases of shell shock while 
posted at Craiglockhart War Hospital from 1915 to 1917.  Through his work with 
traumatized soldiers, Rivers came to believe that although the conditions the soldiers ha  
survived at the front were horrible, it was actually their “repression” of these orrific 
experiences that led to the devastating symptoms of shell shock.  Rivers believed that “It 
is not repression in itself which is harmful, but repression under conditions in which it 
fails to adapt the individual to his environment” (Rivers, 1918).  Acting against the 
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conventional wisdom of the time which encouraged soldiers to use any means possible to 
forget their war experiences, Rivers encouraged his participants to stop struggling against 
the memories and to let them become “tolerable, if not ever pleasant, companions instead 
of evil influences which forced themselves upon his mind” (Rivers, 1918).  Like Freud 
before him, Rivers treated the repression of the memory and not the memory itself as th  
villain:  
…When in place of running away from these unpleasant thoughts he faced them 
boldly and allowed his mind to dwell on them in the day they no longer raced 
through his thoughts at night and disturbed his sleep by terrifying dreams of 
warfare… (Rivers, 1918) 
Object relations theory developed in Great Britain in the early 1940s against the 
back drop of the horror and devastation of two world wars that had unfolded and been 
fought in her front yard.  This new approach to psychoanalysis was grounded in the belief 
that individuals were primarily “object-seeking” (Fairbairn, 1946) and, therefore, that 
psychopathology stemmed from disturbances in each person’s primary caregiving 
relationships. This assumption represented a radical break from the Freudian emphasis on 
the intrapsychic world of pleasure-seeking, drive and fantasy that had defined 
psychoanalysis since Freud’s abandonment of the seduction theory in 1896.  The 
vulnerability of the human psyche to environmental and relational forces became the 
focus of a large part of the psychoanalytic world, re-introducing Freud’s long-abandoned 
idea that the etiology of psychopathology was shaped at least in part by traumatic 
experiences with external objects and the environment.  
The return to theories recognizing the impact of the extra-psychic world and 
emphasizing relationships with others as the driving forces of development made room 
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for psychologists to give voice to ideas concerning the connection between the mind and 
body and the impact of trauma, abuse and neglect, and how the unexpressed, repressed, 
or dissociated emotions associated with these disturbing experiences might instead be 
disguised through their expression in, by, or through the body. 
One of the first psychoanalysts to return to ideas about the mind-body connection 
and the consequences of disruption on this system was D.W. Winnicott.  In “Mind and Its 
Relation to the Psyche-Soma” (Winnicott, 1954), Winnicott presents his theory, based on 
clinical observation, that the infant does not initially experience any differentiation 
between mind and body – in her world the “psyche” represents the experience of physical 
and emotional vitality.  The child’s mind develops when her “good enough mother” fails 
to perfectly meet her needs and create a perfectly responsive environment.  Th se 
tolerable failures facilitate the child’s capacity to recognize the existence of two different, 
yet interactive spheres of existence – what goes on inside her (needs, feelings, etc.) and 
the outside world that usually responds to her needs.  The mother’s normative failures 
foster the development of the mind which, in turn, leads to the child’s awareness of a 
separation between self and object, and an understanding that the child’s needs and 
feelings are her own and reside within her.  The mother becomes recognizably separate 
and reliable. Less-than-good-enough circumstances interfere with the child’s apacity to 
differentiate between self and other, creating a situation where the child will struggle to 
recognize herself as the source of her affects (vs. the environment or others) and feel like
an independent center of initiative who has a sense of agency in the world.  Perhaps the 
most important point that Winnicott makes in this article is that the child’s developm nt, 
optimal or otherwise, occurs in a relational context and that the consequences of a 
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disruption in the child’s mind-body relationship has significant consequences for the
course of her emotional development. 
Winnicott continues this line of thought in “Psycho-Somatic Illness in its Positive 
and Negative Aspects” (Winnicott, 1966). Here, Winnicott discusses psycho-somatic 
illness as “the dissociation in the patient which, as an organized defence, keeps separate 
the somatic dysfunction and the conflict in the psyche.”  Winnicott is clearly stting that 
the dissociation between mind and body occurs specifically to protect the individual from 
what she believes will be the catastrophic impact of integrating the scattered aspects – 
physical and emotional – of memory.  Winnicott appears to be echoing Freud’s belief, 
stated so many years before, that individuals who dis-integrate do so to preserve the 
integrity of the self from the potentially destabilizing power of memories. 
Concurrent with Winnicott’s later musings on the vicissitudes of psychosomatic 
illness was the development of the idea of alexythymia, a term coined by Sifneos 
(Sifneos, 1967)), but most extensively explored by Henry Krystal, a psychologist who 
started his career working with Holocaust survivors.  According to Krystal (Krystal, 
1979, 1983, 1997, 1998), alexithymia is a cluster of symptoms found in a number of 
psychiatric and psychological illnesses, including psychosomatic illness, sub tance abuse 
problems, and trauma, in which there is a disconnect between the cognitive, physical, and 
emotional aspects of experience.  Alexithymic individuals do not recognize their feelings; 
they are unable to tell whether they are angry, sad, hungry, or excited.  They experience 
physical symptoms associated with these feeling states, but do not recognize their 
emotional experiences as the source of these sensations so they cannot utilize their 
feelings as signals regarding the state of the self.  Because of this disconnect, alexithymic 
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individuals have no emotional vocabulary; they are unable to use language to describe 
their states of being.  As a result, their emotional lives are barren and they often lack the 
ability to fantasize or project themselves into the future. 
Krystal found that alienation from affect leads to two distinct methods of coping: 
addictive behavior or psychosomatic illness.  Each strategy works by further isolating the 
individual from her internal states, but through different mechanisms.  Substance abuse 
effectively smothers the uncomfortably uninterpretable sensations while somatization 
concretizes the affect into a physical sensation or symptom.  Both tactics protect the 
individual from the disorganizing and potentially overwhelming power of what she 
experiences as mysterious, outside forces (Krystal, 1979). 
 Like Winnicott before him, Krystal located the source of alexithymic disturbance 
in the disruption in the mother-infant dyad, particularly in the mother’s ability to carry 
out the critically important function of teaching affect differentiation to her c ild: 
 
It is a major part of upbringing to instruct the child about what he/she feels and 
what should be done in a given situation.  In this fashion, the parent demonstrates 
to the child that the more precise the identification of the affect, the more 
effective its use as a signal to one’s self and the better a tool in the “art of living.”  
Thus enabling a child to recognize and tolerate shame is an important 
achievement.  But if, instead of just recognizing shame, the child is enabled to 
recognize seven or more shadings and nuances of that affect…the child gains a 
chance to become familiar and develop tolerance of these affects.  Otherwise, 
these are often deeply buried in the core of an “abscess” around which addiction 
or psychosomatic disease may develop… (Krystal, 1997). 
 
It is the mother’s (or the primary caregiver’s) failure to teach the child t e meanings and 
functions of emotion that leads to the alexithymic individual’s crippling alienatio  from 
her affects. 
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 Krystal’s work continues to build on the body of theoretical evidence that 
establishes a significant connection between the mind and the body and to describe how 
the mind – symbolized by strong affect – can disrupt optimal bodily and cognitive 
functioning (psychosomatic illness, addiction) under certain sets of circumstances.   
However, Krystal’s work also adds the cognitive component to the mind-
body/psychosomatic connection through his assertion that an optimal understanding of 
and ability to utilize emotion as a guide must be learned in a relational context and that 
language develops in this context to facilitate the emotional learning process.   
 
From Mind to Body: The Relationship Between Stress, 
Mood Disorders, and Cognitive Function 
Over the years, researchers have collected an enormous amount of data that 
demonstrates the negative impact of strong emotion, stress, and the individual’s struggle 
to manage these circumstances on the efficient functioning of the brain and endocrine 
system and, thus on cognitive function ((Bale, 2005, 2006; Sapolsky, 2003b; McEwan & 
Sapolsky, 1995; Ohman, Bergdahl, Nyberg, & Nilsson, 2007). There is evidence that the 
hormones involved in the body’s stress response alter the plasticity of the cells in the 
brain’s limbic system leading to the consolidation of neural pathways that keep the body 
in a continuous state of alert, regardless of environmental cues (Sapolsky, 2003a; Garci , 
2001). Further, the chronically elevated levels of these potent chemicals that are 
associated with states of hyper-arousal appear to damage the neurons in these brain areas, 
preventing synapse growth and interfering with certain types of learning and memory 
consolidation (Sapolsky, 2003a; Heflinger & Newcomer, 2001; Garcia, 2001).  
Over the years, Michael Eysenck and his colleagues have investigated the impact 
of anxiety on cognitive functioning and have proposed and updated several theories they 
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believe explain the connection between the two (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007; Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).   The first of these, 
processing efficiency theory (PET) (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), claims that efficient 
cognitive functioning has two distinct components: “performance effectiveness,” or the 
quality of performance and “processing efficiency,” which measures the quantity of effort 
required to reach a certain level of performance. Based on this premise, they sugg st that 
anxiety globally impacts cognition in two distinct and seemingly opposed, ways.  First, 
they believe that anxiety interferes with working memory function by reducing its storage 
and processing capacities.  However, they also posit that anxiety has a motivating effect 
when it comes to “activities designed to improve performance.”  In 2005, Eysenck 
(Eysenck et al., 2005) explored whether anxiety impaired specific cognitive domains – in 
this case visuospatial processing and working memory.  His findings echoed the 
assumptions of PET as well as those of additional studies (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998) 
that anxiety appears to impact the functioning of the domain-free “central xecutive” of 
the cognitive system rather than specific cognitive domains. 
In 2007, Eysenck and colleagues introduced attentional control theory (ACT), an 
updated and expanded version of PET based on developments in cognitive research in the 
fifteen years that had passed since he and Calvo proposed the original theory. PET and 
ACT are united by the assumption that “anxiety disrupts the efficient functioning f the 
cognitive processing center of the [brain’s] working memory system “(Eysenck et al., 
2007).  However, ACT links the efficient functioning of the cognitive executive system 
with two previously unnamed components: shifting and inhibition.  According to ACT, 
anxiety interferes with the cognitive system’s capacity to inhibit irrelevant stimuli, 
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resulting in increased distractibility. This is especially true if the ext rnal stimuli are 
perceived as threatening. Further, anxiety disrupts the cognitive system’s capacity to shift 
between tasks.  In summary, disruptions in shifting and inhibition increase the impactof 
the “stimulus-driven attentional system” on cognition, resulting in increased attention to 
external factors at the expense of concentration. 
Wood, Mathews, & Dalgleish (2001) investigated the impact of anxiety on 
cognitive function by exploring whether a predisposition to anxiety is associ ted with 
impairment in the capacity to inhibit data and/ or stimuli that are irrelevant to current 
tasks or situations.  They define inhibition as “an active process whereby unwanted 
interference from irrelevant information can be prevented, whether consciously or 
nonconsciously” (Wood, Mathews, & Dalgleish, 2001) and suggest that that individuals 
who suffer from anxiety and struggle to inhibit irrelevant stimuli under normal 
circumstances will have even more difficulty focusing on relevant data under stressful 
circumstances.  Thus, anxiety causes one to be more easily distracted and more likely to 
demonstrate a preferential focus on certain kinds of stimuli, leaving fewer resourc  
available for focus on other, more situationally relevant factors. 
Airaksinen, Larsson, and Forsell (2005) looked at the impact of anxiety on 
cognitive function by investigating whether people diagnosed with an anxiety disorder 
(panic disorder, social phobia, and others) show neuropsychological impairments relative
to healthy controls in tasks tapping episodic memory, verbal fluency, psychomotor speed, 
and executive functioning. Compared to normal controls, the anxious group demonstrated 
significant impairments in episodic memory, commonly understood as the memory for 
events and the times, places, emotions, and concept-based knowledge associated with 
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those events, as well as in executive functioning. There were no between group 
differences in the verbal and motor domains.  Anxiety appears to interfere with encoding 
and storage of information, rather than with retrieval of stored material, and this, in turn, 
is associated with problems with divided attention capacity, something we refer to in the 
twenty-first century as multi-tasking. 
Thus, anxiety appears to disrupt the aspects of cognition that are involved in 
discriminating between relevant and irrelevant information and, in turn, these inhibitory 
deficits interfere with efficient encoding and storage of data.  In other words, anxiety 
leaves one vulnerable to distraction and being distracted makes it difficult to focus on 
one, let alone many concurrent cognitive demands.   
Unipolar depression has also been linked to disruptions in cognitive function. 
Airaksinen et. al (2004) used the Trail-Making Test (Reitan, 1958), a measure that 
assesses working memory (Trails A) and cognitive flexibility (Trails B), to investigate 
the impact of depression on cognitive functioning and found that episodic memory and 
cognitive flexibility were significantly impaired in the depression group.   They also 
found that type of impairment is associated with depression type: major depression and 
anxious-depression are related to impairments in memory while dysthymia is linked to 
difficulties with cognitive flexibility and mental set shifting.  According to these results, 
depression, like anxiety, appears to disrupt the encoding and storage processes of 
memory, but not retrieval mechanisms.  
Depression has also been linked specifically to working memory dysfunction and 
problems of executive functioning (Miller, 1975; Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; 
Ilsley, Moffoot, & O'Carroll, 1995), but, until recently, the specific components of 
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memory that are affected had not yet been determined.   Current research has been based 
on a model of working memory first proposed and subsequently built on by Baddeley and 
colleagues (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, Lewis, & Vallar, 1984; Baddeley, 1996; 
Baddeley & Wilson, 2002) envisions memory as a system composed of a central 
executive, and two subordinate, or slave, systems: the visuospatial sketch pad, and the 
phonological loop.  The central executive coordinates the components of memory, but is 
also responsible for “fractionating,” or allotting it to additional processes, like prioritizing 
activities and overseeing the sharing of cognitive resources to permit multitasking.  The 
visuospatial sketch pad is where visual and spatial information is processed and the
phonological loop is responsible for managing auditory information.  Both slave system  
have limited capacities.   
Using Baddeley’s system as the foundation for their research, Christopher & 
MacDonald (2005) compared the performance of three subject groups – depressed, 
anxious, and normal controls – on memory tasks that assessed the functioning of the 
central executive and its two slave systems.  They found significant between-groups 
differences on five of the seven tasks, with the depression group scoring significantly 
lower than the other two groups on three of those five tasks.  On the remaining two tasks 
the depression and anxiety groups performed similarly, but both were significantly 
different from normal controls.  Their data revealed cognitive deficits in depressed 
participants on tasks involving all three components of Baddeley’s memory system, not 
just on the central executive as had been previously reported (Channon, Baker, & 
Robertson, 1993).  They conclude that their findings support attentional focus theories 
(Eysenck et al., 2007)) which posit that emotionally stressful conditions disrupt cogni ion 
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because a portion of cognitive resources are allocated to the intrusive thoughts and other 
conditions of the mood disorder.   
 In sum, both anxiety and depression appear to be associated with cognitive 
dysfunction, though each works through different mechanisms, and impacts different 
domains. 
Psychodynamic/Psychoanalytic views on the relationship between 
emotional stress and psychopathology 
 
Over the past two decades, psychologists and psychiatrists interested in bridging 
the gap between the subjective worlds of their participants and the physiological systems 
that give rise to these phenomena have found strong evidence that stress interferes with 
both emotional and cognitive functioning. The groundbreaking work of Bessel van der 
Kolk and others into the etiology, phenomenology, psychology, and psychobiology of 
PTSD, provides further, and perhaps even stronger, evidence of the powerfully negative 
impact that emotional and physical stress have on cognitive functioning (van der Kolk, 
1999, 2001, 2002; van der Kolk, Greenberg, Boyd, & Krystal, 1985; van der Kolk et al., 
1996 ; van der Kolk, Roth, Pelcovitz, Sunday, & Spinazzola, 2005). They have begun to 
look at how stressors like chronic emotional abuse and neglect and physical and 
emotional trauma lead to stressful physical states in the individual and how the chemistry 
of stress may be involved in the disruption of cognitive functioning and the establishment 
of neural pathways that are related to the persistent patterns of thought and perception 
seen in psychopathology.   This mind-brain research is relevant to the “chemo brain” 
phenomenon because the symptom clusters associated with PTSD include depression, 
anxiety, and cognitive disruption, further elucidating the impact of stress on the human 
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organism and strengthening the case that overwhelming emotional experiences disrupt 
cognitive functioning, particularly in the area of memory.  
A related area of research involves the idea of mentalization, a cognitive concept 
that refers to the individual’s capacity to “make sense of the actions of oneself and others 
on the basis of intentional mental states, such as desires, feelings, and beliefs…” 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004).  The ability to mentalize effectively is seen as a cquired 
skill that is fostered in childhood by adequately attuned parenting.  Under stressful 
developmental circumstances, however, like those involving chronic devaluation, neglect, 
emotional and/or physical abuse, the child does not acquire the capacity to mentalize.  
Without this critically important skill, the child is unable to differentiate between her 
internal environment and the external world, resulting in a sense of unboundedness and 
diffusion of self.  Further, subjective states are experienced as completely separate from 
external realities, as well as from other aspects of the individual’s mental life, resulting in 
a discontinuous, encapsulated experience of self.  This kind of continuous emotional 
stress keeps the individual in a constant state of arousal that compromises executiv  
functioning, learning and memory.  
The Impact of a Breast Cancer Diagnosis on Emotional Functioning 
Receiving a breast cancer diagnosis, entering the unfamiliar world of treatment, 
and joining the community of cancer survivors are life-changing, helplessness-inducing, 
and perception-altering experiences (McKenzie & Crouch, 2004).  A woman often 
receives her diagnosis, undergoes surgery, and begins adjuvant treatment in the course of 
two months or less, a time-table that has the potential to throw her world into disarray.  
The seriousness of the diagnosis demands quick action, leaving little time for extended 
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contemplation of or planning for the impact these events will have on a woman and her 
family. Life-and-death decisions often have to be made in relatively short am unts of 
time (Compas & Luecken, 2002). 
Women with breast cancer have been shown to have elevated levels of stress 
hormones in their blood (Aardal & Holm, 1995), though it is not known whether this is 
due to the cancer itself, the stress associated with receiving a diagnosis of and having 
treatment for breast cancer, or both.  Regardless of the direction of that relationship, it is 
clear that women with breast cancer experience stress and that this stress might be the 
source of treatment-related cognitive problems. 
Breast Cancer and Stress 
Confrontation with a life-threatening illness was not added to the list of PTSD A1 
criteria until the publication of the DSM-IV (A.P.A., 2000).  Since then, a number of 
studies have explored whether or not significant numbers of breast cancer survivors 
suffer from PTSD. Though these studies vary widely in sample size and type, age of 
participants, time post-treatment, and type of instruments used, their results show that 
many breast cancer survivors experience intense helplessness and horror at diagnosis, 
intrusive thoughts, avoidance behaviors, and co-morbid mood disorders without suffering 
from full-blown PTSD.  
 A group from North Shore University Hospital – Cornell Medical Center was the 
first to systematically study the prevalence of PTSD in female cancer survivors (Alter et 
al., 1996) as part of the DSM-IV field trials for PTSD.  They compared a small,   
demographically heterogeneous group of female cancer survivors (n=27) who were at 
least three years past the termination of treatment with a community-based s mple 
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matched for age and socioeconomic status..  Participants’ emotional states were assessed 
by a battery of self-report measures.  They found that cancer survivors had a higher 
prevalence of PTSD (22%) than their community-based counterparts (0%) and that the 
symptoms experienced by the cancer group were similar to symptoms experienced by 
survivors of events traditionally associated with PTSD like combat experience, rape, 
violent assault, and life-threatening accidents.   Though their study results seem to 
suggest that facing a life-threatening illness bore inclusion as an A criterion in the DSM-
IV diagnosis of PTSD, the authors also cautioned that their sample size was small and 
that longitudinal studies with larger samples were needed for more conclusive results. 
 Cordova and colleagues (Cordova et al., 1995) studied a group of 55 early-stage 
(Stage 1 to Stage 3A) breast cancer survivors who were between six months and five 
years past active treatment (chemotherapy and/or radiation).  They assessed each 
subject’s overall quality of life and prevalence of PTSD-like symptoms using a series of 
self-report measures that are strongly correlated with the DSM-IV.  Between 5% and 
10% of the women in their sample suffered from symptoms that would warrant a DSM-
IV diagnosis of PTSD.  However, they also cautioned that because their participants were 
many months post treatment, acute PTSD-like symptoms associated with initial breast 
cancer diagnosis and treatment might not have been captured by their study design 
(Cordova et al., 1995).  In addition, they cited the cross-sectional design of their study, a  
well as the small number of participants as cautions against generalizablity.  Like Alter 
and colleagues (Alter et al., 1996), however, these researchers found evidence pointing to 
the potentially traumatic nature of facing a life threatening illness like breast cancer. 
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 Baider and Kaplan De-Nour investigated the presence of PTSD-like symptoms in 
a relatively large sample (n=238) of Israeli women who had been diagnosed with Stage I
and Stage II breast cancer in earlier studies (Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997).  They 
focused on the “intrusive thoughts” criterion of the DSM-IV diagnosis and found a strong 
correlation between intrusion and psychological distress; intrusion was found to account 
for 30% of the variance in the psychological distress of participants.  In their analysis, 
Baider and Kaplan DeNour suggest that “intrusive thoughts may be more sensitive 
indices of cognitive/affective and physiological responses to the stress associated with 
cancer diagnosis and treatment than are measures of generalized psychological distress” 
(Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997).  Based on these results, they suggest that breast 
cancer participants, while not necessarily suffering from DSM-IV defined PTSD, do 
share a “cognitive style” (Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997) with PTSD sufferers.  
However, the generalizability of these results is limited by the specific circumstances of 
the sample:  13% of participants were Holocaust survivors, while 49% were recent 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union.   These extreme circumstances may be 
combining with cancer diagnosis to produce symptoms that are more serious than the 
norm seen in participants whose only serious life-time stressor is cancer. 
 Green and colleagues (Green et al., 1998) examined the prevalence of PTSD in 
166 women with early-stage breast cancer (Stage I or Stage II with no lymph-node 
involvement) who were between four and twelve months post treatment.  Participants 
were assessed through a combination of self-report questionnaires and investigator-
administered structured clinical interviews.  This method revealed PTSD rates in the 
sample of 3% to 5%, depending on the stringency of assessment criteria employed.  
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These numbers are considerably lower than the similar numbers reported by Alter (Alter 
et al., 1996) and (Cordova et al., 1995), a disparity that the authors attribute to the latter 
studies’ reliance on self-report measures, which, they claim, “tend to overestimate 
diagnoses as there is not the opportunity for an interviewer to assess the severity and/or 
clinical significance of a particular symptom or to determine whether symptoms arose or 
only worsened following the cancer” (Green et al., 1998). However, Green and 
colleagues differentiated between the experiences of the older and younger wom n in 
their sample and found that younger women are more prone to cancer-related PTSD 
symptoms.  Further, they echoed other study results that find a number of PTSD-like 
symptoms in breast cancer survivors, but a low incidence of full-blown PTSD.  Finally, 
they questioned the fit of PTSD to breast cancer diagnosis and treatment as breast cancer 
treatment can continue for months and that different stages of the treatment may be 
characterized by different levels of distress.  
Palmer’s 2004 study (Palmer, Kagel, Coyne, & DeMichele, 2004) of 115 breast 
cancer participants echoed the results of prior studies, finding that although the 
prevalence of full-blown PTSD in this population was low (4%), the percentage of 
women who responded positively to the DSM-IV A2 criterion (responding to the cancer 
event with intense fear, helplessness, or horror) was a relatively high 41%. 
 Pitman and colleagues examined the psychophysiological responses of 37 early 
stage (Stage I to Stage III) breast cancer participants by administeri g a structured 
clinical interview regarding PTSD and exposing them to recordings of their own cancer 
“scripts” and measuring a number of physiological responses including heart rat , skin 
conductance, and electromyogram (Pitman et al., 2001).  Though the number of 
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participants with a current PTSD diagnosis in the sample was small (n=5), their 
physiological reactions were positively correlated with their interview responses and 
elevated to the same level as those of participants whose PTSD results from other types 
of traumatic events.  The authors assert that this relationship provides “psychophysiologic 
support for the proposition that being diagnosed with a life-threatening illness, in this 
case breast cancer can be a stressor sufficient to result in PTSD” (Pitman et al., 2001). 
 An investigation of morning blood cortisol levels by Luecken (Luecken, Dausch, 
Gulla, Hong, & Compas, 2004) adds additional physical evidence for the presence of 
PTSD-like symptoms in newly diagnosed (within six months of study participation) 
breast cancer participants. Seventy-one women with early-stage breast cancer (Stage I to 
Stage III) were screened for past and/or current PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD) with structured, investigator-administered, clinical interviews and self-report 
measures.   PTSD due to breast cancer diagnosis was found in 3% of the sample and past 
MDD was found in 25% of the sample.  Comorbidity of PTSD and MDD was high: 39% 
of participants with past MDD had past or current PTSD; 54% of women with past or 
current PTSD had past MDD.  Blood analysis revealed significantly lower levels of 
morning cortisol in participants with past or current PTSD compared with controls.  
Overall, morning cortisol levels were negatively correlated with number of PTSD 
symptoms endorsed.  Cortisol levels were also significantly lower in participants with 
MDD compared with controls, but the correlation between number of MDD symptoms 
endorsed and cortisol levels was not found.  Women suffering from current PTSD who 
also had a history of MDD had the lowest cortisol levels of all groups compared to 
controls.  These results, combined with those of Oquendo (Oquendo et al., 2003), 
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“suggest neuroendocrine alterations associated with PTSD and MDD in women newly 
diagnosed with breast cancer” (Luecken et al., 2004) – alterations that have the potential 
to disrupt cognitive and emotional functioning. 
Summary 
There is a strong historical foundation for ideas regarding the mind’s ability to 
adversely impact the brain’s normative functioning. Empirical research has convin ingly 
linked stress to changes in brain chemistry and in neuronal pathways in ways that impact 
optimal functioning and are implicated in the development of mood disorders.  Mood 
disorders are associated with cognitive difficulties and a breast cancer diagnos s has been 
associated with the development of mood disorders.   In fact some studies have found that 
up to 46% of breast cancer survivors suffer from depression (Van't Spijker, Trijsburg, & 
Duivenvoorden, 1997). This evidence strongly supports the possibility that the cognitive 
problems seen in breast cancer participants are related to the extreme emotional stress 
inherent in the experience of being diagnosed with and treated for cancer with adjuvant 
chemotherapy.  
Thus, the basic premise of the current research is that the cognitive difficulties 
observed among women being treated with adjuvant chemotherapy for early stage bre st 
cancer are related to the psychological stress of a treatment experience that includes 
chemotherapy, but not to chemotherapy alone.  Following this line of thought, it is then 
reasonable to believe that women who enter the breast cancer treatment experience with 
pre-existing psychological difficulties are more likely to be cognitively impaired than 
their unaffected peers.   These ideas are operationalized in the following ways: 
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Hypothesis 1: Participants who have any lifetime or current diagnosis of a mood disorder 
at the baseline evaluation will score lower on a battery of cognitive tests than participants 
who do not have any lifetime or current diagnosis of a mood disorder at the baseline 
evaluation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: More participants who are cognitively impaired as defined by this study 
will report clinically significant levels of anxiety and/or depression tha p rticipants who 
are not cognitively impaired.  
 
Independent Variables: 
1. Any lifetime or current diagnosis of a mood disorder at the baseline evaluation. 
2. Global cognitive impairment as defined by this study.  
Dependent Variables: 
1. Cognitive domain scores at all three study time points (baseline, six months 
following baseline, six months following second evaluation) as measured by the 
study’s battery of neuropsychological tests  









 The data used in the current research was collected in the context of an earlier 
study whose focus was to investigate the impact of adjuvant chemotherapy on the 
cognitive functioning of post-menopausal, early-stage breast cancer participants.  (Tager 
et al., in press). The current study explored the impact of the breast cancer experience on 
cognition, but focused on the effect of pre-cancer psychiatric status on cognitive domains 
rather than on chemotherapy status.  
Sample 
 Participants were women who had been diagnosed with early-stage breast cancer 
(ductal carcinoma in situ, Stage I, Stage II, or Stage IIIa), had no evidence of metastatic 
disease, and underwent curative breast surgery, either a breast conserving procedure or 
mastectomy with or without breast reconstruction.   
Participants were recruited through collaboration with the breast surgeons and 
oncologists affiliated with the Columbia University Medical Center/New York 
Presbyterian Hospital.  The doctors supplied the names of women who expressed interest 
in participating in the study or in learning more about it to members of the research t am 
who then contacted and screened the potential participants for eligibility.  
Participants 
 
 Seventy-four post-menopausal women between the ages of 45 and 70 were 
initially enrolled in the study.  Of the 74 participants who signed informed consent to 
participate in the study, three were determined to be ineligible to participate prior to the 
T1 testing; and an additional six were not administered a SCID at T1; leaving a study 
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sample of 65 participants.  (For demographics of the study sample see Table 1.)  Further
attrition during the study resulted in a Time 2 sample size of 59 participants and a Time 3
sample size of 53 participants.  
Participant recruitment 
 
Recruitment was conducted through the breast surgeons who made the definitive 
diagnosis of breast cancer in potential participants. The study was advertised to 
participants with IRB-approved fliers posted in the waiting and exam rooms of the
Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center breast surgeons’ practices. Th  fliers invited any 
woman interested in learning about the study to call the study coordinator or to give her 
contact information to her surgeon’s office staff, who would then contact a member of 
the study team. In addition to fliers, a member of the study team was in contact with the 
all of the breast surgeons’ support staff weekly to ascertain whether any woman who 
came in for an appointment was eligible for the study.  A member of the study team was 
also available in surgeons’ waiting rooms to speak with anyone who was interested in the 
study and, if appropriate, to obtain informed consent. If a woman indicated interest in 
participating, a member of the study team met with her, reviewed the study, and 
completed an eligibility screen.  The appointment for the first evaluation was made for a 
time following surgery and before the advent of chemotherapy treatment. 
Participant selection criteria 
The study’s inclusion criteria for participation were the following: 
 
1. Participants had to be women between the ages of 45 and 70. The upper age 
limit of 70 years was chosen because of significant decrements exist in the 
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normative scores between people aged 60-69 versus 70-79 on several of the 
neuropsychological tests that were used in this study.   
2. Participants had to be postmenopausal – defined for the study’s purposes as 
not having had a menstrual period for at least twelve months prior to their 
diagnosis and treatment. 
3. Participants had to have had an early-stage breast cancer diagnosis (up to 
Stage III, no metastatic disease), surgery to remove the cancer (lumpecto y 
or mastectomy with sentinel lymph node removal if necessary), and 
undergone a course of adjuvant treatment (chemotherapy, radiation, hormonal 
therapy, or all three). 
4. Participants could not be receiving hormone replacement treatment at the time 
of assessment. 
5. Participants could not have a prior history of breast cancer or other cancer 
treatment. 
6. Participants could not have a pre-morbid history of health problems or serious 
psychiatric illness. Participants could not be on a long-term course of 
psychotropic medication to address anxiety, depression, or any other serious 
psychiatric condition.  
7. Participants had to have minimal reading and speaking fluency in English (to 
at least a 5th Grade level) The requirement of English fluency was a necessary 
constraint because many of the measures used have not yet been translated 
into other languages, or normed and validated in non-English speaking 
populations. 






Eligible participants were evaluated after surgery, but prior to the onset of any
adjuvant treatment (baseline/Time 1) allowing the study to determine partici n s’ pre-
adjuvant-cancer-treatment, baseline psychiatric status as well as their baseline levels of 
cognitive functioning – the independent and dependent variables, respectively. Informed 
consent and a HIPAA-compliant consent were obtained at the beginning the first 
evaluation session.  Participants were assessed for the second time between four to six 
months after the initial evaluation (Time 2) and for the third and final time approximately 
six months after the second assessment (Time 3).  The timing of the second assessment 
was dependent on whether or not the subject had undergone chemotherapy treatment. 
Testing and interviews were conducted at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, 
in offices in the Department of Psychiatry/Behavioral Medicine or Medical Oncology, or 
if necessary at the subject’s home or office. All testing was done by trained test rs 
Baseline/Time 1 Assessment: 
Participants were contacted by phone approximately one week after surgery to 
schedule their first visit. The first evaluation included all of neuropsychological tests 
previously listed, and all self-report forms. This evaluation required approximately 1.5-2 
hours.  Following the evaluation, the subject was contacted by another member of the 
study team to schedule and/or administer the SCID-I. 
Approximately 3 months following the first visit participants were contacted by 
phone for a brief follow-up conversation and reminder about the study.  This contact was 
intended to sustain the subject’s connection to the study in order to maximize retention in 
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the study through the final assessment.  
Time 2 and Time 3 Assessments:  
Approximately 6 months after the first visit participants were contacted to 
schedule their second evaluation. For participants who received chemotherapy, this 
second assessment occurred within one month following the completion of chemotherapy 
treatment. The second visit included all neuropsychological tests, and all self-report 
forms, the same assessment as Time 1.  Again scheduling and administration of the 
SCID-I took place following the assessment.  Approximately 6 months following the 
second evaluation, participants were contacted to schedule the third and final assessment.  
The final visit included all neuropsychological tests, and all self-report forms, the same 
assessment as Time 2.  Again scheduling and administration of the SCID-I took place 
following the assessment. 
Participant payment and follow-up  
Participants received $50 for each of the three assessments.  A check was mailed 
to each subject approximately 2-3 weeks after each assessment.   
Approximately 1 month after the second assessment, participants received a 
written report summarizing the results of their first two evaluations.  If any subject 
exhibited significant cognitive deficits, change in cognitive function, or significa t 
psychological distress, she was contacted to discuss these findings and was offered a list 
of referrals.  
Approximately one month following the final assessment, participants received a 
written report summarizing the results of all three evaluations.  Again, she was contacted 
to discuss these findings and was offered a list of referrals. 







Psychological measures: psychiatric and psychological status   
 The primary independent study variable was presence of any lifetime or current 
diagnosis of a mood disorder at baseline. The method used to determine the presence or 
absence depression and anxiety in participants was the Structured Clinical Interview for 
the DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002), which 
provides a diagnosis of lifetime and current psychiatric disorders according to standard 
diagnostic criteria. This interview has been widely validated for use in both research and 
clinical practice. It is a more sensitive, objective measure of psychological status than 
self-report measures. Only the SCID-I Mood and Anxiety modules were administered in 
order to limit the focus to depression and anxiety disorders and to minimize the length of 
the interview. The SCID-I was administered by a trained interviewer and took 
approximately 20-40 minutes. 
In addition, affective distress was assessed with two self-administered/s lf-report 
measures. The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI)  (Beck, Rial, & Rickels, 1974), 
(Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988) includes twenty-one items that assess depressive 
symptoms. The BDI assesses a general syndrome of depression and has been well-
validated against clinician ratings (Beck et al., 1988). It has been widely used in various 
medical populations. The Zung Self-rating Anxiety Scale (ZAS) (Zung, 1971b), (Zung, 
1971a) is a twenty-item measure assessing general anxiety symptoms. The ZAS is 
sensitive to clinical changes and has been used in conjunction with depression measures 
to differentiate between depression and anxiety (Zung, Magruder-Habib, Velez, & Alling, 




Estimating pre-morbid intelligence   
 
Intelligence is typically measured as an IQ score gleaned from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS III). Administering the entire WAIS III is very time 
consuming; therefore, general intellectual functioning was estimated utilizing an average 
of the North American Adult Reading Test (NAART) and a demographic intelligence 
estimate (Barona, Reynolds, & Chastain, 1984). The two estimates together provide a 
better estimate of general intellectual functioning than either one alone (Willshire, 
Kinsella, & Prior, 1991). This method of estimating intelligence is a widely accepted 
proxy for administering a full-scale IQ measure. The remaining battery of tests is listed 
below.  
Neuropsychological measures.  
  The neuropsychological tests utilized for this study assess the cognitive domains 
of attention/concentration, language, memory, visuospatial skills, and motor speed.  
These particular areas of cognitive functioning appear to be most vulnerable in this 
population based on the small body of research that has investigated effects of 
chemotherapy on women with breast cancer.  The specific tests used to measure 
performance in each of these broad categories are described below. 
1. Attention/Concentration/Working Memory:  
Attention and concentration as well as working memory refer to an individual’s 
ability to take in and process information in a timely fashion.  Attention can be divided 
into different forms such as sustained attention, an individual’s ability to focus on and 
process information for an extended period of time, or divided attention, an individual’s 
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ability to focus on more than one thing at a time.  Problems with attention can be 
manifest in either the visual and/or the verbal domain.  Thus, multiple tests of attention, 
measuring different aspects of attention were utilized in this study. 
The Trailmaking Test (Reitan, 1958) is a pencil and paper test of speed for visual 
search, attention, mental flexibility, and motor function that is sensitive to cognitive 
dysfunction.  The test takes approximately 4 minutes to administer. 
The Digit Span test is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence ScaleIII 
(Wechsler, 1997) that is part of the Working Memory Index.  It is a test of working 
memory and mental manipulation of information.  Individuals are asked to repeat back 
numbers of increasing length, first forward and then backward.  The test takes 
approximately 6 minutes to administer. 
The Digit Symbol test is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scal III 
(Wechsler, 1997) that is part of the Processing Speed Index.   It is a pencil and paper test 
of speed of processing.  The test takes approximately 3 minutes to administer.  
 Arithmetic is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (Wechsler, 
1997) that is part of the Working Memory Index.  It is a mental arithmetic test 
incorporating processing of verbal information and mental manipulation of that same 
information.  The test takes approximately 7-8 minutes to administer.  
 This Number/Letter test is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scal  III 
(Wechsler, 1997) that is part of the Working Memory Index.  It is a more complex test of 
working memory and mental manipulation involving both numbers and letters.  The test 
takes approximately 5-6 minutes to administer.    
 




The Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) (Benton, Hamsher, & 
Sivan, 1983) is a standardized, valid and reliable test of verbal fluency.  The subject is 
asked to generate words after being given a phonemic cue, in this case, a letter of the 
alphabet.  This test takes approximately 4 minutes to administer. 
The Boston Naming Test (Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weinstraub, 1983) is a 
standardized, valid and reliable measure of word-finding abilities.  Particip nts must 
name objects from pictures.  This test takes approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
3. Memory 
The Buschke Selective Reminding Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974) is a standardized, 
valid, and reliable measure of verbal memory through a list learning procedure.  
Participants are asked to recall a list of 12 words over six trials.  This test tak s 
approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
The Benton Visual Retention Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974) is a standardized, 
valid, and reliable measure of visual perception and visual memory.  Participants are 
asked to draw from memory geographic shapes of increasing complexity.  This test takes 
approximately 6 minutes to administer. 
4. Visuospatial 
The Rey Complex Figure Test – Copy (Meyers & Meyers, 1995) is a test of 
visuospatial constructional ability.  Participants are asked to copy a complex geometric 
design.  This test takes approximately 3-4 minutes to administer. 
5. Motor 
The Grooved Pegboard (Klove, 1963); (Matthews & Klove, 1964) is a 
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standardized, valid, and widely used measure of manual dexterity that requires complex 
visual-motor coordination.  This test takes approximately 3-4 minutes to administer. 
 The Finger Tapper (Halstead, 1947) is a standardized, valid, and widely used test 
of manual dexterity and fine motor speed.  This test takes approximately 3 minutes to 
administer. 
Participant Ratings  
 
Participants were administered the SCID-I at Time 1 to determine if they met 
DSM-IV criteria for mood disorder.   Participants who met criteria for any lifetime or 
current mood disorder diagnosis at Time 1 were rated “DXy”, while the participants did 
not meet criteria for any lifetime or current mood disorder diagnosis at baseline w re 
rated “DXn.” Of the 65 participants who were administered a Time 1 SCID-I, 30, or 
46%, were rated DXy while the remaining 35 participants, or 54%, were rated DXn. 
Participants completed two self-report measures, the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) and the Zung Anxiety Index (ZAI), at each evaluation to further assess 
psychological status.  For the purposes of this study, participants were rated depressed 
(DEPy) if they reported clinically significant levels of depression (BDI score > 10) and 
not depressed (DEPn) if they did not (BDI score < 10).  Similarly, participants were rated 
anxious (ANXy) if they reported clinically significant levels of anxiety (ZAI score >45) 
and not anxious (ANXn) if they did not (ZAI score < 45).  
Participants were considered “impaired” (IMPy) if they met the following criteria: 
1) scoring more than one standard deviation below the norm for age and education level 
on two or more of the neuropsychological tests; or 2) scoring more than two standard 
deviations below the norm for age and education level on one test.   They were 
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Analyses performed & Results 
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 17.0. Cognitive test raw scores were 
converted to z-scores based on standard norms to allow for comparison of means. To 
compare subject characteristics, independent sample t-tests were used for continuous 
measures and Chi-square tests for categorical measures.  
Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1 posited that participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder 
at Time 1 would score lower on the battery of cognitive tests at Times 1, 2, and 3. The t-
tests revealed a significant difference in performance between diagnosed participants and 
undiagnosed participants at Time 1 in the domain of attention (p=0.03) and a borderline 
significant difference (p=0.06) in the domain of verbal memory (Table 2).  Contrary to 
the hypothesis, however, the participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder 
scored higher than the undiagnosed participants, indicating that the presence of a pre-
morbid mood disorder is associated with better performance in the domains of attention 
and verbal memory.  A breakdown of performance by individual neuropsychological test 
yielded similar results: the participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder cor d 
higher than the undiagnosed participants (Table 5). 
The t-tests revealed a significant difference in performance at Time 2 in the visual 
spatial domain (p=0.04) and in the domain of visual memory (p=0.01) (Table 3). Once 
again, however, the results are contrary to the study hypothesis as the participants who 
were diagnosed with a mood disorder scored higher than the undiagnosed participants, 
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indicating that the presence of a pre-morbid mood disorder is associated with better 
performance in the visual spatial domain and the domain of visual memory. A breakdown 
of performance by individual neuropsychological test yielded similar results: the 
participants who were diagnosed with a mood disorder scored higher than the 
undiagnosed participants (Table 6). 
The t-test did not uncover any significant differences in performance at Time 3 by 
domain (Table 4), but did uncover one significant difference in performance on the 
Buschke Long-Term Retrieval of words index (Table 7), 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that more participants who are cognitively impaired as 
defined by this study would report clinically significant levels of anxiety and/or 
depression than participants who are not cognitively impaired. 
Chi-square analysis examining combinations of cognitive impairment status, self-
reported depression status, and self-reported anxiety status detected a signific nt 
relationship between impairment status and self-report of depression (Table8, X2=0.034), 
but, once again in opposite direction of what was proposed in the hypothesis.  At Time 1, 
more participants who were not cognitively impaired reported clinically significant 
feelings of depression than participants who were cognitively impaired.  No significant 
results were detected at Time 2 or Time 3 (Table 9, Table 10).  
 





Summary of Results 
The results of the t-tests performed on the current research indicate that a mood 
disorder diagnosis is not associated with comparatively lower performance in certain 
cognitive domains as was predicted by Hypothesis 1.   In keeping with this paradoxical 
result, the chi-square analysis performed to test Hypothesis 2 revealed that fewer of the 
cognitively impaired participants reported clinically significant levels of anxiety and 
depression than the unimpaired participants. In other words, the participants who reported 
feeling significantly depressed or anxious were not in the cognitively impaired group.  
This study’s finding that mood disorders are associated with better performance in 
certain cognitive domains contradicts the literature cited earlier that consistently links 
depression and anxiety to cognitive dysfunction.  Anxiety is associated with disruptions 
in the brain’s capacity to filter out distracting stimuli, leading to global and domain-
independent interference in cognitive functioning (Eysenck et al., 2007; Airaksinen, 
Larsson, & Forsell, 2005; Eysenck et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2001; Derakshan & Eysenck, 
1998; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).  Depression is also linked with disruptions in storage and 
encoding of memory, as well as with disruptions in executive functioning (Airaksinen, 
Larsson, Lundberg, & Forsell, 2004; Baddeley & Wilson, 2002; Baddeley, 1996; Burt et 
al., 1995; Ilsley et al., 1995; Baddeley et al., 1984; Miller, 1975; Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974). So to what can we attribute results indicating that depression and anxiety are 
associated with better cognitive performance and that there is a negative relationship 
between cognitive impairment and self-report of anxiety and depression in this research? 
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First, the results of the current research must be examined and understood in the 
context of the study for which the data was originally collected – an investigation in o the 
existence of chemobrain (Tager et al., in press) or “cancer-related cognitive dysfunction” 
(Clegg, 2009) a constellation of symptoms including memory loss, problem organizing 
one’s thoughts, and a general “fogginess” in thinking reported by breast cancer
participants who have gone through chemotherapy.  A number of studies (Anderson-
Hanley, Sherman, Riggs, Agocha, & Compas, 2003) suggest that adjuvant chemotherapy 
for early-stage breast cancer is associated with cognitive impairment elated to attention, 
memory, and visuospatial functioning, but inconsistencies in study designs, measures, 
and sample characteristics call into question the generalizability of those results.  
Regardless of these structural imperfections, prior research suggests that it is the impact 
of chemotherapy drugs on the physical well-being of breast cancer participants th t is the 
source of “chemobrain.”  However, there is considerable debate within the chemobrain 
research community concerning the pathways through which chemotherapy disrupts 
cognition and, as a result, investigations have not approached the question from a 
consistent perspective nor have they employed consistent research designs. Cross-
sectional designs have been used, but they lack baseline data for comparison (Ahles et al., 
2002; Brezden et al., 2000; Schagen et al., 1999; van Dam et al., 1998; Wieneke & 
Dienst, 1995). Investigations comparing the impact of different chemotherapy drugs and 
combinations have been done (Jansen et al., 2005; Tangpong, Cole, & Sultana, 2007), 
but, again, they lack the consistency necessary to establish a reliable pattern of impact. 
Brain imaging studies have identified patterns of change in brain structure in participants 
who have undergone chemotherapy, but to date, none of the imaging studies have 
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baseline images to use for comparison (Ferguson, McDonald, Saykin, & Ahles, 2007). 
Each of these studies has yielded significant results which support the existence of 
“chemobrain,” but because of considerable differences in approach, and, in some cases, a 
lack of pre-cancer data to use for comparison, their generalizability is limited and, 
therefore, no clear picture of the cause and/or effect of chemobrain has yet been drawn.    
The Tager and McKinley study, upon which the current research is based, was 
intended to improve upon some of the limitations of prior chemobrain research by 
employing a longitudinal study design that collected pre-chemotherapy, baseline data, 
thus providing a means for within subject comparisons where participants act as their
own controls, making changes in performance easier to detect and building in controls for 
conflating variables.  In spite of the improved design, significant study findings were 
minimal: time by treatment interaction was significant in the Motor domain (p=.007) with 
poorer performance in women treated with chemotherapy; for the other domains, 
however, scores did not significantly vary over time by group.  Thus, the Tager and 
McKinley study (in press) concluded that in postmenopausal women, chemotherapy was 
not associated with changes in cognitive function in the areas reported by breast cancer 
survivors: attention, memory, and information processing.  In addition, the result 
indicating significant disruption in motor skills in women treated with chemotherapy 
could be secondary to peripheral neuropathy rather than an indication of more general 
declines in cognitive processing. 
The current research took the Tager and McKinley (in press) study’s findings into 
account and removed chemotherapy, as well as any surgical or cancer-diagnosis-related 
physical problems from the equation.  Instead, the current research focused solely on pr -
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existing psychiatric and psychological conditions as the primary contributing factors to 
the complaints of cognitive disruption reported by breast cancer chemotherapy survivor .   
A considerable literature exists to link anxiety, depression and other psychiatric 
conditions to cognitive disruption, so the current research was built on a solid foundation.  
Contrary to the literature, however, this approach did not uncover a link between 
psychiatric diagnoses and impaired cognitive functioning.   So we return, once again, to 
the question at hand:  what factors might have contributed to these unexpected findings? 
One place to look is at the sample used in the current study to determine if there 
was anything about this particular group of participants that might have contributed to the 
results found in the current research.  At baseline, 34% of the sample was found to be 
cognitively impaired prior to chemotherapy treatment according to the standards of 
impairment defined for this study  -- a figure that is considerably higher than the 19% rate 
of mild cognitive impairment found in US adults below the age of 75 (Lopez et al., 
2003). 
It is possible, then, that the cognitive problems reported by breast cancer 
participants who receive chemotherapy begin before treatment and that what participants 
experience as chemobrain is related to the experience of receiving a breast cancer 
diagnosis and undergoing surgery and/or  is part of the organic process of cancer.  Using 
this scenario, it is possible that cognitive disruptions start before treatment and that 
chemotherapy alone is not a factor in “chemobrain.”  It is also possible that bec use such 
a large percentage of the sample was already impaired prior to treatment that any impact 
of chemotherapy was undetectable.  There may already be too much going on in the 
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cognitive domains due to diagnosis and/or disease process to tease out the impact of 
chemotherapy, if there even is an impact of chemotherapy. 
There are other sample characteristics that bear examination (See Tabl 1).  The 
sample that participated in this study -- though a relatively homogeneous group compared 
to the general population -- was quite diverse ethnically, compared to studies that 
followed a similar design and yielded similar results (Jenkins et al., 2006). The 
composition was as follows: 67.2% white, 14.8% African-American, 8.2 % Hispanic, and 
10% Asian.  Additionally, the sample as a group was of above average estimated 
intelligence (mean estimated IQ = 112.7) and averaged more years of education (16.3 
years).  It is possible that there is something about these characteristics tha  masked any 
significant impairment or allowed the participants to compensate for any difficult es in 
unidentified ways.  This idea is supported by the fact that the nine women who withdrew 
from the study without completing the Time 2 evaluation had significantly fewer years of 
education and significantly lower IQ as a group.  These women also showed significantly 
poorer performance at baseline in language, motor skills, attention, and verbal memory.  
It is possible, then, that if the sample been more diverse in terms of education and IQ, the 
overall results might have been different.  What remains unclear, however, is whether 
that hypothetical difference would have been due to chemotherapy or education and IQ.  
In addition, a majority of the nine women who withdrew from the study had had a 
mastectomy and were scheduled to receive chemotherapy.  Chemotherapy is associated 
with higher disease stage and mastectomy is often a traumatic experience for women as it 
greatly impacts feelings about body image (Cimprich, Ronis, & Martinez-Ramos, 2002). 
Both of these factors have the potential to raise levels of psychological stress, so it is 
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possible that if these participants had remained in the study, significant indicators of 
cognitive impairment would have been detected. 
Limitations of the Present Study  
The current research was limited by a problem inherent to many studies:  using 
data collected in the service of one set of hypotheses to investigate another set of related, 
but significantly different questions.   The data that forms the basis of the current study 
was gathered to explore the impact of chemotherapy on the cognitive functioning of post-
menopausal women undergoing adjuvant treatment for early stage breast cancer. The 
investigators gathered data on the psychological states of the participants and how issues 
like depression, anxiety, and fatigue might individually impact cognition or interact to 
impact cognition, but questions of mood and psychiatric diagnosis were not central to the 
research question.   The measures used in the original research are well-tested and 
reliable (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006); and valid within the context of that original 
study, but it is probable that they are not the ideal tools for assessing the questions posed 
by this study. 
  As the literature cited earlier confirms, emotional states, particularly anxiety and 
depression, are strongly linked with cognitive disruption.  Where the problem lies, I 
believe, is in the presumption that DSM-IV-defined psychiatric diagnosis would capture 
breast cancer-specific emotional experience.  While they are in the same ballpark, they 
are not the same phenomena.  The SCID, used here to determine psychiatric diagnosis, 
the independent variable in this study, is an excellent diagnostic tool, but for the purposes 
of this study that is also where its weakness lies.   So many variables combine to create 
the breast cancer survivor’s overall experiences, not to mention the fact that eac  s age of 
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treatment has distinct emotional challenges, that a construct as stable and specific as a 
DSM-IV diagnosis may not be the best measure to capture the components of the breast 
cancer experience that might contribute to the chemobrain phenomenon.  Breast cancer 
diagnosis and treatment have the potential to raise a multitude of concerns regarding 
sexuality, body image, femininity, fertility, and mortality, all of which, singly or in 
combination, are enough to disrupt a woman’s normative emotional state and, by 
extension, her normative cognitive functioning.  Some experiences may be acute, others 
may develop over time, and all appear to be strongly impacted by individual differences.  
Women are clearly experiencing symptoms associated with trauma, but not in the 
consistent or stable patterns that the SCID attempts to identify.  
The lack of significant results in this study may also be attributed to the tests that 
were employed to measure cognitive functioning.  Evidence links anxiety and depression 
to disruptions in executive function and the storage and encoding of memory, but the 
tests used in this study do not measure these domains specifically enough to catchese 
disruptions.  Three of the tests employed by this study to evaluate working memory are 
subtests of the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997). However, the primary focus of Digit Span, 
Arithmetic, and Number/Letter is assessing the subject’s ability to mentally manipulate 
verbal and numerical information, not her ability to store and/or encode that information 
– the aspects of memory that are reportedly most disrupted by mood symptoms.   Two 
additional memory tasks, the Buschke Selective Reminding Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974) 
and the Benton Visual Retention Test (Sivan, 1992), also assess retrieval of verbal and 
visual information, but not storage or encoding of those types of information. 
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Emotionally stressful conditions have been linked to disruptions in executive 
functioning – the brain’s ability to coordinate memory, attention, and motor skills to 
create a coherent experience of and set of reactions to outside stimuli – because the 
intrusive thoughts and distractions characteristic of mood disorders demand a portion of 
cognitive resources that would otherwise be dedicated to normative brain function (Wo d 
et al., 2001). Thus, one would expect that the participants in the study diagnosed with 
mood disorders would score lower on tasks that assess executive function than their peers 
without mood disorder diagnoses.  Tasks that measure executive functioning assess 
divided or alternating attention, novel organization of concepts or information, as well as 
concentration.   
It is possible that the tasks used in the present research to evaluate executiv 
functioning are not sensitive enough to assess it adequately.  The Controlled Ora Word 
Association Test (COWAT) (Benton et al., 1983), which engages executive functioning 
through its demand for novel organization and production of information in response to a 
specific cue, is primarily a measure of verbal fluency. Attention and concentration, other 
crucial components of executive function, were also assessed in this study by the Rey 
Complex Figure Test (Meyers & Meyers, 1995), but the Rey is primarily a task of 
visuospatial organizational ability.  The Trailmaking Test (Reitan, 1958) is perhaps the 
best measure of executive functioning used in this research as it demands coordinatin 
between visual search, attention, mental flexibility, and motor functioning.   However, no 
significant differences were found between the participants with mood disorder diagnoses 
and their undiagnosed peers on any of these tasks. 
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The SCID, BDI, and Zung are all well-known and reliable measures of psychiatric 
diagnosis, depression, and anxiety but the questions they ask may not adequately capture 
the complex and multilayered psychological experience of women struggling with breast 
cancer, and this undetected and so-far unquantified experience may be what most 
interferes with cognitive function. Literature cited earlier in this document suggests that 
while anxiety and depression are certainly part of the breast cancer survivor’s experience, 
intrusive thoughts, a primary symptom of PTSD, are equally prominent.  The SCID does 
ask questions about PTSD symptoms, but only in the context of diagnosing the disorder, 
which requires consistent report of multiple symptoms over a specific amount of time.  
Thus, it is possible that the SCID, despite its reliability, is not a valid measure of the 
constellation of emotional and physical experiences of women with breast cancer.  
Similarly, the Beck and the Zung may not capture the particular experiences of altered 
mood associated with the breast cancer experience. 
There is also evidence that younger women struggling with breast cancer have a 
more complex and emotionally disruptive experience of illness and treatment (Baucom, 
Porter, Kirby, Grenmore, & Keefe, 2006; Epping-Jordan et al., 1999; Northouse & 
Swain, 1987) and most studies have not separated women into post- and pre-menopausal 
categories.  Thus, it is possible that results supporting the presence of chemobrain in 
other studies were due to the presence of younger women in the studies, reflecting th ir 
particular age-related difficulties.  The current study featured postmenopausal 
participants only, possibly removing a source of variance that characterized other studies, 
and possibly revealing something unique about the cancer-related experiences of post-
menopausal women.  Perhaps post-menopausal participants are more emotionally stable 
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as a group compared to pre-menopausal women due to their age and age-related factors.  
Post-menopausal women are less likely to have young children in the home, are more 
likely to have finished initial educational pursuits, and are more likely to be more solidly 
established in jobs, careers, and family.  Thus, there are fewer external complications.  
Perhaps, due to their age, postmenopausal participants are more emotionally stable than 
younger participants in general, leading to less breast-cancer treatment-related disruption 
than anticipated.  Maybe this study’s hypotheses were more attuned to the cancer-related 
cognitive experiences of younger women and did not adequately capture the seemingly 
less emotionally complex experience of post-menopausal women.  
Another explanation may come from a recent brain-imaging study that examined 
brain activity in identical twin sisters, one of whom had been treated for early-st ge 
breast cancer while the other had not been through any cancer diagnosis or treatmen  
(Ferguson et al., 2007).  The sisters were administered an identical battery of cognitive 
tests and MRI scans.  The twins’ performance on the cognitive testing was statistically 
the same, but the cancer survivor had significantly more complaints about her cognitive 
functioning.  Interestingly, the MRI scans provided possible empirical support for her 
struggles, revealing more activity in her brain than in her twin’s, suggesting that she wa  
working harder to achieve comparable scores on the same tasks as her sister.  The “case 
study” nature of this work, the fact that the investigators have no earlier MRIs of the 
participants to use for comparison, and other design questions limit the generalizability of 
these results, but this work does pose interesting questions about women’s experience of 
chemobrain and the mixed empirical results that appear to simultaneously confirm a d 
deny its existence. Perhaps chemobrain is simply the cancer survivor’s real exp rience of 
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having to work harder, to literally use more brain power to maintain her pre-cancr 
diagnosis and treatment baseline of cognitive functioning.  Maybe studies have revealed 
only minimal or mixed evidence in support of chemobrain despite patient report because 
of the brain’s remarkable capacity to compensate for injury and stress by re-routing 
impulses or combining different nets of neurons to maintain pre-morbid functioning.   
This could account for the phenomenology of chemobrain as well as for the lack of 
consistent evidence for cognitive dysfunction.  Women experience their brains working 
harder and due to this cognitive compensation, the deficits being compensated for ar 
remediated before they show up on cognitive tests.  
It is also possible that there was something about the testing situation employed in 
the current research that impacted subject performance.  In the majority of cases, the 
same testers met with the same participants three times and spoke with them on t phone 
several times to collect data during the course of the study.  The context in which these 
contacts took place – cancer diagnosis, surgery, and chemotherapy treatment – was 
emotionally laden and, by report of subject and tester, added a personal dimension to the 
testing situation that may have influenced subject performance for the better.   Further, 
study participants reported thinking about tasks between testing sessions and looking 
forward to testing sessions as “an hour and a half when I won’t be thinking about having 
cancer or how sick my next treatment will make me feel.”  Thus, it is possible that the 
presence of the study in subject’s lives and the opportunity for mastery and positive 
challenge it presented affected performance for the better and obscured any significant 
cognitive impact chemotherapy treatment might have had. 
 
 





The current research does not make a particularly significant contribution to the 
chemobrain literature per se, but it does, I believe, provide an opportunity to stop and ask 
a number of questions about this very real phenomenon and how it is currently studied.  It 
is clear at this point that an association between chemotherapy and cognitive problems 
exists (Clegg, 2009; Anderson-Hanley et al., 2003), but the answer to what it is about 
chemotherapy that is causing these problems remains elusive. I doubt that a single cause 
will ever be identified.  Thus, I believe it is time to broaden the scope of the chemobrain 
investigation to include improvements in the treatment experience and interventions for 
remediating the condition.  I also feel strongly that the benchmarks of succes  at this 
juncture should be based on self-report of quality of life and sense of efficacy, rather than 
on performance on neuropsychological tests as the empirical research does not appear to 
be capturing the experiences cancer participants describe. There are tests that measure 
effort which might evidence differences if the thesis of the twin study is correct.  Whether 
chemobrain is physical, psychological, or a combination of both, giving participants the 
tools to manage their experience will provide a sense of empowerment that is critically 
important to healing. 
As a clinical psychologist, I believe that knowledge is the key to empowerment, 
so I would include information about cancer-related cognitive problems in the 
discussions participants have with their oncology team prior to the start of chemotherapy 
treatment.  I understand the worry that mentioning chemobrain will result in partici n s 
reporting that they have it – a self-fulfilling prophecy if you will – but jusas not all 
participants experience all the possible side effects of treatment, not all participants will 
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experience cognitive disruption.  Including cancer-related cognitive disruption as a 
possible side effect will make it a legitimate part of  the treatment experience for women, 
give them permission to talk about it with their medical teams, and, perhaps most 
important, empower them to ask for help managing and remediating symptoms.  If 
chemobrain information is included in a patient’s preparation for treatment, women will 
have a vocabulary for discussing their experiences from the beginning of treatment nd 
be in a better position to make use of their medical teams as sources of information and 
support.  
I also believe it would help participants if there was a clinical psychologist 
available to or formally part of every oncology practice. Clinical psychologists are 
trained to assess participants for changes in mood, provide emotional support and 
behavioral interventions, and to administer psychological and neuropsychological tests; 
thus, they are in a unique position to be of assistance to an oncology practice, managing 
the emotional aspects of treatment while leaving the medical professionals t  focus on the 
medicine.  A psychologist could also be of assistance during medical appointments by 
providing an additional, more objective set of ears, by taking notes and keeping track of 
medications, and by being available to help participants and their caregivers manage the 
emotionally challenging aspects of talking about cancer treatment.  
The best first step towards designing effective chemobrain interventions would be 
to speak at length with women who have been through treatment – perhaps using a focus 
group format -- and to use their experience to develop a uniform set of questions about 
treatment course, physical symptoms and side effects, emotional reactions to treatment, 
struggles to maintain relationships and careers, and other relevant information to create a 
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comprehensive picture of chemobrain.  Researchers could then use this information to 
develop treatments that survivors could use to remediate any problems that might have 
developed during treatment, including helping them regain their sense of agency and 
competency, one of the most significant losses of the chemobrain experience.  The 
efficacy of these interventions would be based on self-report of well-being, not on 
performance on tests because empirical methods do not appear to capture the experienc  
of chemobrain very well.   
Participants have taken advantage of many effective, traditional treatments to 
work through and manage their treatment-related experiences including survivorship 
programs (cancercare.org, americancancersociety.org), and individual and group 
psychotherapy (Boutin, 2007). However, I believe that there are new avenues of 
remediation to explore that individually or in combination with more established methods 
of treatment will help women regain their sense of agency and overall cognitive 
competency.  There has been an explosion in research about the potential benefits of 
cognitive training and remediation, leading to a growing consumer market for games and 
puzzles designed for adults to use on their PDAs and home computers many of which are 
focused on brain exercise, memory boost (Nintendo DS, lumosity.com)   It would be 
interesting to engage these companies in chemobrain intervention research, perhaps
arranging trials where some participants would use the products during treatment to see if 




Mood Disorders and Cognitive Function 53 
 
 
Directions for Future Research 
To date, chemobrain research has employed too many different study designs and 
asked too many different questions for the results to present an organized and definitive 
picture of the mechanisms or impact of chemotherapy on the cognitive functioning of 
cancer survivors.  Therefore, to unify the field and to add value to future research, I 
believe that it is critically important that chemobrain researchers adopt the guid lines of 
the International Cognition and Cancer Task Force that formed in 2003 and convened 
again in 2006 in an attempt to establish a set of uniform guidelines for chemobrain 
research that will remove the confounds and methodological problems that have limited 
the generalizability of results up to this point (Vardy, Wefel, Ahles, Tannock, & Schagen, 
2008). 
One of the most important aspects of this new research protocol would be an 
increased emphasis on including baseline data in all studies.  As discussed earlier in this 
document, cross-sectional and imaging studies have made important contributions to the 
emerging understanding of “chemobrain,” but without baseline data as to use for 
comparison, this information has limited generalizability.  Longitudinal studies have 
gathered post-diagnosis, post-surgical, and pre-chemotherapy data, but it is possible that 
the stresses inherent in these circumstances have already impacted the cognitive 
functioning of participants.  The unexpected 34% baseline impairment rate found in the 
Tager and McKinley sample is just one example of a finding that illustrates he need for 
pre-morbid, pre-surgery, baseline data.  Thus, thinking about new ways to gather pre-
diagnosis, truly baseline information about cognitive functioning is of paramount 
importance.  Perhaps researchers interested in cancer-related cognitive problems could 
Mood Disorders and Cognitive Function 54 
 
 
follow the example of the Harvard Nurses’ Health Study and conduct a large-scale 
initiative to collect normative data on cognitive functioning through primary care 
physicians or gynecologists.  This data collection might be more complex due to the time 
commitment involved in administering a battery of neuropsychological tests, but it co ld 
be presented as an additional dimension of health maintenance and prevention, as well as 
a contribution to future medical research, particularly as cancer survivorsh p continues to 
increase. 
Research cited earlier in this document also shows that pre-menopausal women 
who receive treatment for early stage breast cancer are having different experiences of 
diagnosis, treatment, and survivorship based on a combination of physiological and 
environmental factors than their post-menopausal peers.  Pre-menopausal women who 
experience early menopause as a result of chemotherapy may confront distressing 
physical symptoms due to decreases in reproductive hormones (Epping-Jordan et al., 
1999) in addition to managing the significant side effects of chemotherapy.  It has been 
well-documented that the advent of menopause has a considerable emotional impact on 
women as it raises questions about femininity, fertility, sexuality, and a multitude of other 
health- and identity-related issues.  This impact may be significantly magnified in pre-
menopausal women, whose fertility is compromised at the same time that they have 
received a cancer diagnosis, raising questions about mortality, survival, and qu lity of 
life.  It is possible that these additional physical and emotional disruptions expo e pre-
menopausal women to levels of stress that are high enough to influence mood and 
cognitive functioning.  To date, the Tager and McKinley study is one of the only 
chemobrain investigations to focus solely on post-menopausal women and, as has been 
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illustrated in this document, the positive findings were minimal at best.  It is possible 
then, that the evidence of cancer-related cognitive problems found in other studies is du  
to the inclusion of pre-menopausal women and the influence of their more-complex 
emotional and physical experience. The possibility that these characteristics contribute to 
different experiences of cancer diagnosis and treatment, suggests that future st dies 
should separate participants based on pre-morbid menopausal status.  
Another direction for future research would involve looking at cancer-related 
cognitive disruption through the lens of trauma.  Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is 
associated with myriad emotional and physical problems, including cognitive dysfunction 
(Baider & Kaplan De-Nour, 1997). Few breast cancer participants experienc  full-blown 
PTSD (Cordova et al., 1995), but it is possible that the stressors involved -- a life-
threatening diagnosis, disfiguring surgery, demanding treatment, an uncertai future – are 
overwhelming and horrifying enough to result in emotional and cognitive disruptions.  
Furthermore, the traumatic events unfold over a protracted period of time – up to a year 
in some cases from diagnosis through surgery and treatment – making the cancer and th  
ever-present possibility of death a constant stressor.  Many cancer survivors (Jennings, 
2009) report that the end of active treatment is one of the most emotionally difficult times 
to manage because one is no longer doing something about the cancer.  Frequent contact 
with health care professionals, a source of reassurance and support, abruptly ends at this 
point as well, leaving the survivor with the first unscheduled time since diagnosis.  In 
addition, many a survivor’s support system celebrates “the end,” while the survivor is at 
the beginning of having time and space to contemplate and experience what has 
happened to her and her family and to think about mortality.   It is possible then that we 
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are seeing a traumatic syndrome that differs from PTSD in its course, but that is equally 
potent in its disruptive power.  




Table 1: Description of participants and comparison of psychiatric diagnosis groups at 
baseline (Time 1)  
aDXy, diagnosed with pre-cancer mood, anxiety, or combined mood-anxiety condition; bDXn, no pre-
cancer psychiatric diagnosis; cIQ, intelligence quotient; are shown as either Mean (SD) or Percent% (n). 
 






Age (yrs) 60.7 (5.9) 59.8 (5.9) 60.6 (5.8) 
Estimated IQc 112.7 (8.6) 113.8 (10.7) 111.3 (10.8) 
















































































































Table 2  
Means and standard deviations of baseline cognitive domain scores grouped by psychiatric diagnosis status at Time 1 
 
DOMAIN N Group Mean 
(SD)a 
N DXy Mean (SD) a N DXn Mean (SD) a p-value 
Lang 65 -0.3368 30 -0.1595 35 -0.4887                0.26 
Motor 65 0.2225 30 0.2296 35 0.2164                0.96 
Attn 65 0.3671 30 0.5576 35 0.2038 0.03* 
Visspa 65 -1.3168 30 -1.0797 35 -1.5200                0.49 
Vismem 63 -0.0698 30 0.0217 33 -0.1529                0.56 
verbmem 65 -0.3477 30 -0.0937 35 -0.5654                0.06 
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Table 3  
Means and standard deviations of baseline cognitive domain scores grouped by psychiatric diagnosis status at Time 2 
 
DOMAIN N Group Mean 
(SD)a 
N DXy Mean (SD) a N DXn Mean (SD) a p-value 
Lang 59 0.1103 28 0.2680 31 -0.0321                 .32 
Motor 59 0.5321 28 0.3863 31 0.6639                  .33 
Attn 59 0.4151 28 0.5782 31 0.2677                  .12 
Visspa 59 -1.4468 28 -0.4304 31 -2.3648 .04* 
Vismem 59 0.2015 28 0.5329 31 -0.977 .01* 
verbmem 59 -0.2544 28 0.0132 31 -0.4961                  .09 
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Table 4 
Means and standard deviations of baseline cognitive domain scores grouped by psychiatric diagnosis status at Time 3 
 
DOMAIN N Group Mean (SD)a N DXy Mean (SD) a N DXn Mean (SD) a p-value 
Lang 52 0.1888 27 0.2991 25 0.0698 0.49 
Motor 51 0.6274 26 0.4774 25 0.7833 0.28 
Attn 52 0.4880 27 0.5711 25 0.3983 0.32 
Visspa 51 -0.4708 26 -0.2904 25 -0.6584 0.27 
Vismem 51 0.0660 27 0.2354 24 -0.1246 0.24 
verbmem 52 0.1304 27 0.3496 25 -0.1064 0.13 
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Table 5 
Means and standard deviations of baseline neuropsychological measures, grouped by cognitive domain and psychiatric diagnosis status 
at Time 1 
 N Mean of Group 
(SD) a 
N DXy Mean (SD)a N DXn Mean (SD)a t-value p-value 
MOTOR 65 0.2225 (1.16) 30 0.2296 (1.35) 35 0.2164 (0.98) 1.138 0.96 
Finger Tapper-Dom Hand 62 1.6682 (1.38) 29 1.6472  (1.23) 33 1.6867 (1.51) -0.11 0.91 
Finger Tapper-Non Dom 
Hand 
62 1.2774 (1.22) 29 1.1859 (1.15) 33 1.3579 (1.29) -0.55 0.58 
Pegboard- Dom Hand 63 -0.7538 (1.88) 30 -0.5277 (2.00) 33 -0.9594 (1.78) 0.91 0.37 
Pegboard- Non Dom Hand 63 -1.1911 (2.07) 30 -0.8313 (1.79) 33 -1.5182 (2.28) 1.32 0.19 
LANGUAGE 65 -0.3368 (1.16) 30 -0.1595 (1.20) 35 -0.4887 (1.12) 0.046 0 .26 
COWAT 65 0.0157 (0.90) 30 0.0837 (0.88) 35 -0.0426 (0.93) 0.56 0.58 
Boston Naming Test 63 -0.6838 (1.93) 30 -0.4027 (2.00) 33 -0.9394 (1.86) 1.10 0.28 
ATTENTION 65 0.3671 (0.68) 30 0.5576 (0.52) 35 0.2038 (0.75) 2.17 0.03* 
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 N Mean of Group 
(SD) a 
N DXy Mean (SD)a N DXn Mean (SD)a t-value p-value 
Trail Making B 65 0.4271 (1.01) 30 0.7513 (0.68) 35 0.1491 (1.16) 2.49 0.02* 
WAIS:  Digit Symbol 65 0.5995 (1.00) 30 0.7160 (0.90) 35 0.4997 (1.07) 0.87 0.39 
WAIS:  Digit Span 65 0.1855 (0.92) 30 0.3103 (0.86) 35 0.0786 (0.97) 1.01 0.32 
WAIS:  Arithmetic 64 0.1673 (0.91) 29 0.4248 (0.79) 35 -0.0460 (0.96) 2.11 0.04* 
WAIS:  Number/Letter 62 0.2990 (0.90) 29 0.3838 (0.93) 33 0.2245 (0.88) 0.70 0.49 
VISUOSPATIAL 65 -1.3168 (2.56) 30 -1.0797 (2.35) 35 -1.5200 (2.74) 0.69  0.49 
Rey 65 -1.3168 (2.56) 30 -1.08 (2.35) 35 -1.52 (2.74) 0.70 0.49 
VERBAL MEMORY 65 -0.3477 (0.99) 30 -0.0937 (0.95) 35 -0.5654 (0.99) 1.96  0.06 
Buschke Total Recall 65 -0.3477 (0.99) 30 -0.0937 (0.95) 35 0.5654 (0.99) 1.96 0.06 
Buschke Long Term 
Retrieval 
65 -0.4103 (1.04) 30 -0.1823 (1.04) 35 -0.6057 (1.00) 1.67 0.10 
Buschke Long Term 
Storage 






























   6
3 
Buschke Consistent Long 
Term Retrieval 
65 -0.5078 (0.99) 30 -0.3703 (0.99) 35 -0.6257 (0.99) 1.04 
 
0.30 
VISUAL MEMORY 63 -0.0698 (1.16) 30 0.0217 (1.06) 33 -0.1529 (1.26) 0.59 0.56           
Benton Visual Retention: 
# Correct 
60 0.1153 (1.07) 27 0.0.0081 (0.79) 33 0.1097 (1.14) -0.70 0.49 
Benton Visual Retention: 
# Errors 
60 -0.3115 (1.26) 27 -0.4467 (0.90) 33 -0.4155 (1.41) -0.75 0.46 
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Table 6  
Means and standard deviations of baseline neuropsychological measures, grouped by cognitive domain and psychiatric diagnosis status 
at Time 2 
 N Mean of Group 
(SD) a 
N DXy Mean (SD)a N DXn Mean (SD)a t-value p-value 
MOTOR 59 0.5321 (1.08) 28 0.3863 (1.08) 31 0.6639 (1.09) -0.99  0.33 
Finger Tapper-Dom Hand 59 1.8097 (1.28) 28 1.5311 (1.33) 31 2.06 (1.19) -1.62 0.11 
Finger Tapper-Non Dom 
Hand 
59 1.6059 (1.23) 28 1.3229 (1.09) 31 1.8616 (1.31) -1.71 0.93 
Pegboard- Dom Hand 57 -0.5053 (1.60) 28 -0.4529 (1.59) 29 -0.5559 (1.63) 0.24 0.81 
Pegboard- Non Dom 
Hand 
57 -0.9140 (1.65) 28 -0.8561 (1.61) 29 -0.9700 (1.72) 0.26 0.80 
LANGUAGE 59 0.1103 (1.16) 28 0.2680 (1.19) 31 -0.0321 (1.13) 0.99 0.32 
COWAT 59 0.4381 (1.02) 28 0.4400 (0.90) 31 0.4365 (1.14) 0.13 0.99 
Boston Naming Test 59 -0.2175 (1.76) 28 0.0961 (1.91) 31 -0.5006 (1.60) 1.31 0.20 
ATTENTION 59 0.4151 (0.76) 28 0.5782 (0.61) 31 0.2677 (0.85) 1.60 0.12 
Trail Making A 59 0.5576 (0.98) 28 0.6982 (0.82) 31 0.4306 (1.10) 1.05 0.30 
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 N Mean of Group 
(SD) a 
N DXy Mean (SD)a N DXn Mean (SD)a t-value p-value 
WAIS:  Digit Span 57 0.3439 (1.00) 27 0.4793 (0.82) 30 0.2220 (1.14) 0.97 0.34 
WAIS:  Arithmetic 58 0.1047 (1.00) 28 0.4157 (0.92) 30 -0.1857 (1.00) 2.38 0.02* 
WAIS:  Number/Letter 58 0.4336 (0.98) 28 0.6875 (0.85) 30 0.1967 (1.04) 1.96 0.06 
VISUOSPATIAL 59 -1.4468 (3.71) 28 -0.4304 (1.33) 31 -2.3648 (4.81) 2.06 0.04* 
Rey 59 -1.4468 (3.71) 28 -0.4304 (1.33) 31 -2.3648 (4.81) 2.06 0.04* 
VERBAL MEMORY 59 -0.2544 (1.17) 28 0.0132 (1.23) 31 -0.4961 (1.07) 1.70 0.09 
Buschke Total Recall 59 -0.2544 (1.17) 28 0.0132 (1.23) 31 -0.4961 (1.07) 1.70 0.09 
Buschke Long Term 
Retrieval 
59 -0.2497 (1.12) 28 0.1025 (1.17) 31 -0.5677 (0.98) 2.34 0.02* 
Buschke Long Term 
Storage 
59 -0.2049 (1.07) 28 0.1350 (1.12) 31 -0.5119 (0.95) 2.40 0.02* 
Buschke Consistent Long 
Term Retrieval 
59 -0.3398 (1.17) 28 -0.0104 (1.24) 31 -0.6374 (1.04) 2.11 0.04* 
VISUAL MEMORY 59 0.2015 (0.91) 28 0.5329 (0.76) 31 -0.0977 (0.94)  0.01* 
Benton Visual Retention: 
# Correct 
59 0.3585 (0.85) 28 0.6304 (0.78) 31 0.1129 (0.86) 2.42 0.02* 
Benton Visual Retention: 
# Errors 
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Table 7 
Means and standard deviations of baseline neuropsychological measures, grouped by cognitive domain and psychiatric diagnosis status 
at Time 3 
 N Mean of 
Group (SD) a 
N DXy Mean (SD)a N DXn Mean (SD)a t-value p-value 
MOTOR 51 0.6274 (0.99) 26 0.4774 (1.17) 25 0.7833 (0.77) -1.10 0.28 
Finger Tapper-Dom 
Hand 
50 1.7586 (1.30) 26 1.5469 (1.51) 24 1.99 (0.99) -1.21 0.23 
Finger Tapper-Non 
Dom Hand 
50 1.4524 (1.28) 26 1.1608(1.40) 24 1.77 (1.06) -1.72 0.09 
Pegboard- Dom Hand 50 -0.2084 (1.53) 26 -0.2715 (1.49) 24 -0.1400 (1.61) -0.30 0.76 
Pegboard- Non Dom 
Hand 
50 -0.5448 (1.45) 26 -0.5265 (1.50) 24 -0.5646 (1.42) 0.09 0.93 
LANGUAGE 52 0.1888 (1.19) 27 0.2991(1.03) 25 0.0698(1.34) 0.69 0.49 
COWAT 52 0.6315 (1.05) 27 -0.5278 (0.85) 25 0.7436 (1.23) -0.74 0.46 
Boston Naming Test 51 -0.2782 (1.78) 26 0.0350 (1.77) 25 -0.6040 (1.77) 1.29 0.20 
ATTENTION 52 0.4880 (0.62) 27 0.5711 (0.54) 25 0.3983 (0.70) 1.00 0.32 
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 N Mean of 
Group (SD) a 
N DXy Mean (SD)a N DXn Mean (SD)a t-value p-value 
Trail Making B 52 0.5808 (0.80) 27 0.6237 (0.85) 25 0.5344 (0.75) 0.40 0.69 
WAIS:  Digit Symbol 52 0.6798 (0.99) 27 0.6763 (0.74) 25 0.6836 (1.21) -0.03 0.98 
WAIS:  Digit Span 50 0.4324 (  0.83) 26 0.5627 (0.69) 24 0.2912 (0.95) 1.16 0.25 
WAIS:  Arithmetic 51 1.9080 (12.33) 27 0.4533 (0.80) 24 3.5446 (18.02) -0.89 0.38 
WAIS:  Number/Letter 52 0.4954 (  0.94) 27 0.6630 (0.79) 25 0.3144 (1.06) 1.35 0.18 
VISUOSPATIAL 51 -0.4708 (1.17) 26 -0.2904 (1.09) 25 -0.6584 (1.24) 1.13 0.27 
Rey 51 -0.4708 (1.17) 26 -0.2904 (1.09) 25 -0.6584 (1.24) 1.13 0.27 
VERBAL MEMORY 52 0.1304 (1.09) 27 0.3496 (0.88) 25 -0.1064 (1.24) 1.53 0.13 
Buschke Total Recall 52 0.0996 (1.06) 27 0.4107 (0.83) 25 -0.2364 (1.18) 2.30  0.03* 
Buschke Long Term 
Retrieval 
52 -0.0148 (1.06) 27 0.1248 (1.00) 25 -0.1656 (1.13) 0.98 0.33 
Buschke Long Term 
Storage 
52 0.0287 (1.01) 27 0.1367 (0.96) 25 -0.0880 (1.08) 0.80 0.43 
Buschke Consistent 
Long Term Retrieval 
52 -0.1048 (1.16) 27 0.0700 (1.11) 25 -0.2936 (1.21) 1.13 0.26 
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Benton Visual 
Retention: # Correct 
51 0.2476 (1.02) 27 0.3744 (0.88) 24 0.1050 (1.16) 0.94 0.35 
Benton Visual 
Retention: # Errors 
51 -0.1157 (1.19) 27 0.0963 (1.00) 24 -0.3542 (1.35) 0.93 0.18 





































Chi-square analysis of self-report of depression and anxiety by impairment status at Time 1.
 
 DEP X2 ANX X2 
yes no  yes no  
IMP yes 2 15 0.034* 3 14 0.14 
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Table 9 
Chi-square analysis of self-report of depression and anxiety by impairment status at Time 2.
 
 DEP X2 ANX X2 
yes no  yes no  
IMP yes 5 9 0.53 6 8 0.55 

































   7
2 
Table 10 
Chi-square analysis of self-report of depression and anxiety by impairment status at Time 3.
 
 DEP X2 ANX X2 
yes no  yes no  
IMP yes 3 9 0.24 5 7 0.24 
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